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  Stefán Snaevarr
Abstract
I try to rejuvenate Cleanth Brooks's old thesis about the
'heresy of paraphrase.' This I do by analysing a couple of wellknown poems and by performing thought experiments of the
"possible world" kind. They show that paradigmatic examples
of poems are not paraphrasable. A prosaic text can be
improved with the aid of a paraphrase, but a typical poem
cannot. The deeper explanation for the non-rephrasability of
poetry is that our understanding of it is basically tacit. In this
way I hope to give Brooks's original thesis a more solid
foundation.
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1. Introducing the problem
In this article, I want to discuss the question whether or not
poems can be paraphrased. The idea of the nonparaphrasability of poetry was one of the central tenets of the
New Criticism. The fact that this school of criticism does not
exist anymore is perhaps one of the explanations for the fact
that the thesis of heresy has not been discussed much in
recent years. In actual fact there has never been much
systematic discussion about the thesis. But as I hope to show,
it is well worth probing into and decidedly needs rejuvenation.
My aim is to show that there is more than a grain of truth in
the thesis that paradigmatic examples of poetry cannot be
rephrased in any satisfactory manner. Further, I will try to
explain the non-paraphrasability of poems by the means of my
contention that our knowledge of them is typically tacit.
The darling of the New Critics, T.S. Eliot, was once asked by a
lady what he meant by the line 'lady, three white leopards sat
under a juniper tree.' He replied, "I meant 'lady, three white
leopards sat under a juniper tree.' " The implication is of course
that the line is not paraphrasable. One of Eliot's greatest
admirers, the New Critic Cleanth Brooks, coined the phrase 'the
heresy of paraphrase.' Another New Critic (and poet), Archibald
MacLeish, said, 'A poem should not mean but be.'[1]
Obviously, poems cannot be retold if they only are, but do not
mean. However, they can be meaningful and at the same time
impossible to rephrase satisfactorily.
It seems intuitively plausible that a poem is typically an
ambiguous text. Its rhythm, style, sound, images, emotional
flavour and intellectual aspects, the denotations and
connotations of its words, and even its content and graphic
aspects, are inseparable. The whole is bigger than the sum of
its parts; a poem is a holistic phenomenon. If this is the case,
then form and content cannot be separated in any clear-cut
manner, so abstracting the content (the message) from the
poem is a risky and none too rewarding business. Further,
rhythm often plays an important role for the meaning of a
poem and rhythm can hardly be mirrored by propositions. Add
to this the importance of metaphors in a host of poems and the
difficulties (even impossibilities) of paraphrasing metaphors,
and the thesis of heresy seems quite plausible.[2] It does not
get any less plausible if we consider the following: we can
often improve upon everyday utterances and academic texts
by clarifying them. Actually, we can clarify texts by rephrasing

them. In contrast to this, it does not make any sense to say
that we improve upon a poem by clarifying it, either by
paraphrasing it or in other ways. It is actually an open question
as to whether we can make changes to a poem without having
created a new one.
I think it is high time to take a look at Cleanth Brooks's way of
defending the theory of heresy. He did not deny that poems
could be paraphrased up to a point, or that such a paraphrase
can be useful in some contexts. What he did deny is that a
paraphrase can replace a poem or capture its essence.
Moreover, attempts at a complete paraphrase of poems tend to
need metaphors in order to capture their meaning, but these
metaphors in their turn stand in need of a paraphrase.
Certainly, many poems contain propositions that are easily
rephrased, but we must not mistake them for the inner core of
these poems. Actually, such propositions are justified in the
context of the poem as a whole, not in connection with a
general paraphrase. Thus, a proposition like John Keats's
'Beauty is Truth, Truth is Beauty' gets its precise meaning and
significance from its relation to the total context of the
poem.[3]
2. Defining the concepts
Brooks was on the right track, and I want to use the remainder
of this article to give his thesis a more solid foundation. I will
begin by putting forth a stipulative definition of the concept of
a non-paraphrasable text on the basis of his analysis: 'A text is
non-paraphrasable if and only if a paraphrase neither can
replace the text nor capture its essential meaning.' Admittedly,
the notion of essential meaning is not exactly clear, I must rely
on your intuitive understanding of what the essential meaning
of a text is. [4] Suffice it to give the following example: In the
lyrics of the Beatles' song 'She loves you,' the core (essential)
meaning seems to be that A is telling B that B wrongly thinks
that his girlfriend does not love him any more, but that is not
right, etc.
By 'paraphrase of a poem' I mean 'a prosaic (non-poetic)
rewording of a poem.' As for the concept of 'paraphrase,' it
would be useful to take a look at a couple of dictionary
definitions, the first one being 'rewording of a text, giving the
meaning another form.'[5] Another dictionary defines the verb
'to paraphrase' as 'to explain or translate with latitude.'[6] The
latter definition obviously indicates that there is a certain
connection between the concept of a paraphrase on the one
hand, and those of explanation (in the sense of explication)
and translation on the other. This seems plausible because
when we translate a text we try to say the same thing in other
words, which is tantamount to an attempt to paraphrase it.
(We might even say, conversely, that paraphrase is a kind of
translation.) And when we explicate a text we try to make it
easier to understand by using a different set of words to say
the same thing but in a clearer manner. Sometimes an
explication is closer to a summary, which in its turn tries to
give the essential meaning of a text or an utterance.
Based on the discussion above, I define 'paraphrase' as
'rewording of a text, giving the meaning another form, in some
cases clarifying the text and capturing its essential meaning.' I
will stipulate that (a) a paraphrase must be able to replace the
original text and/or (b) capture its essential meaning.
Paraphrases of the first kind I call 'reworders,' the second kind
'probers' because they try to probe into the depth of the text
as a part of a depth interpretation. Such an interpretation tries
to unveil hidden essences of meaning in texts and can in the

case of poetry usually be expressed in a few pointed
sentences. In order to qualify as a prober, P must be a sort of
a translation of the text with the aid of 'the translation manual'
of a certain depth interpretation. If the interpretation were, for
instance, of the deconstructivist kind, the manual would
include some deconstructive rules (or anti-rules).
As for the word 'meaning,' I use it in this article in the sense
(!) of 'sense plus connotations (and suchlike[7]) of words,
utterances and texts', not 'reference.' In short, I am talking of
the meaning we grasp in understanding and ignore completely
the question of whether or not this kind of meaning can be
ultimately reduced to the truth condition of sentences. The
type of meaning I am discussing can both be utterer's meaning
and textual meaning.[8]
In contrast to the question of the truth conditions, I will briefly
discuss possible answers to the question whether it holds for all
utterances, texts and suchlike, that they are somehow not fully
paraphrasable. Let us look at some arguments against the
thesis that no utterance can ever be paraphrased: In the first
place, it seems intuitively strange to maintain that utterances
like 'John and Mary went home' as uttered in workaday
circumstances are not really paraphrasable or that they are as
difficult to paraphrase as poems by T.S. Eliot. Secondly, there
are cases where the ability to rephrase utterances is a
necessary condition for understanding them.[9] If someone is
asked whether he has understood a presidential candidate's
speech and he responds by reiterating it verbatim, we
congratulate him on his good memory. But we still lack
evidence for his understanding. That evidence we can only get
if he can rephrase it. Thirdly, I think that the possibility of
paraphrasability is built into the very concept of a linguistic
expression of an empirical theory.
Can we test the theory if we cannot paraphrase it, for instance,
if we think that its original formulation is not clear enough for
testing? So some paraphrasability seems possible, which of
course does not prove that there are fully paraphrasable
utterances. Consider again the case of John and Mary. In more
male chauvinist times than ours, paraphrasing 'John and Mary
went home' as 'Mary and John went home' would perhaps not
quite have captured the original. The reason is that there could
have been a convention saying that a man's name must be
mentioned first because males are more important than
females. If that were the case, 'Mary and John went home'
would have had important connotations different from the
original.
3. Analysing an example
Now, it is high time that we illustrate the thesis of heresy with
an example. Consider the following lines from Ezra Pound's
'Canto I'[10], which incidentally consists to a large extent of a
translation of Homer's Ulysses:
And then went down to the ship,
Set keel to breakers, forth on the godly sea, and
We set up mast and sail on that swart ship,
Bore sheep aboard her and our bodies also
Heavy with weeping, and winds from sternward
Bore us out onward with bellying canvas,
Circe's this craft, the trim-coifed goddess.

Then sat we amidships, wind jamming the tiller,
Thus with stretched sail, we went over sea till
day's end.
Sun to his slumber, shadows o' er all the ocean,
Came we then to the bounds of deepest water,
To the Kimmerian lands, and peopled cities
Covered with close-webbed mist, unpierced ever
With the glitter of sun-rays
Nor with stars stretched, nor looking back from
heaven
Swartest night stretched over wretched men
there.
The ocean flowing backward, came we then to the
place
Aforesaid by Circe.[11]
Rephrasing these lines, and for that matter the whole poem,
while not easy, does not seem impossible. Let us try our hand
at it: 'We went down to the ships, plunged them into the sea
and sailed on the ocean, which is of godly provenance. We
carried our black sheep (here the expression is to be
understood in a literal fashion) aboard at the same time as we
boarded the vessel, while in tears. The wind was blowing our
way, so the ship sailed rather quickly. This was due to the
magical powers of Circe, who is a goddess.' And so on and so
forth.
Let us assume that we show this paraphrase to a stranger, who
neither knows Pound's poem nor Homer's epic and ask him
what kind of a text this is. Is it a paraphrase of a novel,
everyday discourse in a pre-modern civilisation, a fairy-tale, an
epic or a modern poem? Would it not require quite a leap of
imagination on his part to determine that this is actually from
the two last categories?
Contrast this to a paraphrase of a scientific paper or book. In
most cases, we would have no problem identifying the nature
of the object of the paraphrase. A paraphrase of Einstein's
book on the theory of relativity could hardly be mistaken for
the paraphrase of a novel or a book about politics. So
rephrasing a scientific text is probably more rewarding than
paraphrasing a poem, a fact that ought to count in favour of
the thesis of heresy. The attempted paraphrase of 'Canto I'
also counts in favour of the thesis. The paraphrase seems like
an empty shell, far removed from the complex organicity of
Pound's poem. It cannot capture the particular rhythm of the
poem, which suggests among other things the movements of
the ship. Further, Pound's use of Homer creates a set of
associations, which are hardly paraphrasable in any fruitful
manner. And just the very Verfremdungseffekt (the effect of
estrangement) of taking this part of Homer and wedding it to a
completely different type of discourse, as Pound does at the
end of the poem[12], is also not easily captured by a
paraphrase. Pound's poem can therefore be subsumed under
my definition of a non-paraphrasable text.
4. Visiting possible worlds
To be sure, I do not doubt that there are cases where poems

could be paraphrased in a similar fashion as non-poetic texts.
Take a look at the following example, a poem by William Carlos
Williams:
This Is Just to Say
I have eaten
the plums
that were in
the icebox
and which
you were probably
saving
for breakfast
Forgive me
they were delicious
so sweet
and so cold[13]
We can try to paraphrase the poem (make a rewording of it) in
the following fashion: 'I ate the plums that were in the icebox.
In all probability you kept them in order to eat them at
breakfast. I am sorry, the plums were tasty, they were very
sweet and cold.' This is a reworder of the poem and seems to
be a good enough replacement (it would be an even better
replacement if we made its rhythm conform to that of the
poem). Therefore, this is an adequate reworder, given my
stipulation. Admittedly, the task at hand is a bit more difficult if
we want to make a prober out of it. Such a prober could be
based on a depth interpretation of the poem as conveying the
message that we human beings are easily led into temptation,
but in most cases that is something we have to live with it.
C'est la vie!
The problem is the obvious one that the number of possible
depth interpretations is infinite and, mutatis mutandis, the
same holds for the number of probers. But who says that there
is no such thing as the correct depth interpretation? And who
says that such depth interpretations are always useful? Brooks
certainly would have contested their usefulness. In our case
the result of such a contesting is something Brooks would not
have liked; namely that if a poem can only be reworded, not
given any fruitful depth interpretation, then it is paraphrasable
for all intents and purposes. So if there is such a thing as
paraphrasable text, Williams's poem is, unless its soft rhythm
plays a decisive role in its meaning.
Now, does this mean that the thesis of heresy is wrong? No,
not at all. In the first place, by just looking at a paraphrase of
the poem we would not have the slightest clue that it was a
paraphrase of a poem, unless told so. So it seems that a
paraphrase of this poem has certain features in common with
paraphrases of more 'poetical' poems such as Pound's 'Canto
1.' Secondly and much more importantly: If there is such a
thing as a paraphrasable poem, Williams's poem cannot be a
paradigmatic example of a poem for the simple reason that
such poems are parasitic upon non-paraphrasable ones. Poems
like the one by Williams get their identity from being
challenges to high modernistic poetry or even poetry as such.

It is almost as if the American poet were teasing us by
implicitly saying, 'Look, I have presented this text in a poetic
form, therefore it is a poem, since poetry has no essential
nature. Whatever is presented as a poem is a poem.'[14] The
identity of such a poem consists among other things in their
balancing between being poems and anti-poems; the aesthetic
device used is the Verfremdungseffekt, the shock of having
something unpoetical presented as poetry.
Imagine a possible world P.W.1 where we only have what we in
our world call 'paraphrasable poems' (let us call them 'p.p.s' for
the sake of convenience; a paradigmatic example would be
Williams's poem). Is it certain that this possible world would
need the notion of poetry in order to classify the p.p.s in
meaningful and useful way? No, because the difference
between prose and what we call 'poetry' would be so unclear
that the inhabitants of P.W.1 would have no use for the notion
of poetry.
The arch-p.p., Williams's poem, might be called 'a parody of
'real' poem' in our world. In P.W.1 it would not make sense to
call it 'a parody.' In a similar fashion, it does not make sense to
ask whether there would be parodies of "Mona Lisa" in a
possible world where the painting does not exist. A painting
which in our eyes would look exactly like "Mona Lisa" but with
a moustache would not be a parody in the possible world in
question.
Let us look at another possible world example: We might
imagine a possible world P.W.2 where art has always been like
the avant-garde art of the twentieth century. In P.W.2, a
person called Marcel Duchamp could display a urinal at an art
exhibition, sign it R. Mott, and call it "Fountain," but it would
still not be the same artwork (or anti-artwork) as in the actual
world. For Duchamp's "Fountain" is whatever it is by virtue of
being an implicit attack on prevalent notions of art. Those
notions would be quite different in the possible world
discussed. In an analogous manner, Williams's text (poem?)
would not have any shocking effect in P.W.1, in a glaring
contrast to the effect it could have had in our world some
decades ago. Even if P.W.1 actually employed the concept of a
poem, Williams's text would not count as an anti-poem, since it
has not broken with any tradition. Add to this the fact that a
host of people in our world would flatly deny that Williams's
text is a poem but rather see it as a piece of everyday
discourse, undeservedly called 'a poem.' So whatever virtues
this poem might possess, being a paradigmatic poem is not
one of them. This means that if my earlier description of the
typical features of poems is correct and Williams's poem is a
typical example of a p.p., then we can conclude by saying that
non-paraphrasable poems are paradigmatic and the
paraphrasable ones are parasitic on them.[15]
5. Discussing tacit knowledge
I think that the deeper explanation for the non-rephrasability
of typical poems is that our understanding of them is basically
tacit. If we possess propositional knowledge of a given X, then
we can describe X adequately by putting forth a series of true
propositions about the nature of it. However, if we cannot
rephrase a certain poem, then we cannot describe it
adequately with the aid of propositions (or indeed anything
else). Therefore, our understanding of it cannot be entirely
propositional.
The very idea of tacit knowledge evokes the image of Michael
Polanyi, who famously said, 'We know more than we can

tell.'[16] Our knowledge of a physiognomy, for instance a face,
is tacit. The reason is that we know a physiognomy as a whole,
without being able to identify its different parts.[17] I can
know the faces of friends and relatives with a somnambulistic
certainty without being able to describe them. Faces are
Gestalts and so perhaps are poems; we have seen earlier that
typical poems must be regarded as being wholes, which are
greater than the sum of their parts. To be sure there are
important differences between the grasping of a poem and the
perception of a face. We cannot grasp a poem unless we are
able to identify its different parts. Nevertheless, if the
knowledge of faces is tacit by virtue of us perceiving them as
being bigger than the sum of their parts, it seems tempting to
think that the same holds for poems.
In order to vindicate this claim, I seek inspiration in the
thought of certain followers of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein never
used the expression 'tacit knowledge', but there is no doubt
that it was on the tip of his tongue. Norwegian philosopher
Kjell S. Johannessen points out that Wittgenstein says in §78
of the Philosophical Investigations that we can perfectly well
know how a clarinet sounds, but this knowledge cannot be put
in words. Johannessen thinks that our knowledge of artworks,
of which the knowledge of the sounds of clarinet can be an
example, is a brand of tacit knowledge, which he terms
'knowledge by familiarity.'[18] Such a knowledge is not a
know-how, it is in some ways a (tacit) know-that (our
knowledge of faces must be some kind of a tacit know-that).
Obviously, knowing that a given sound is the sound of a
clarinet is a different brand of knowledge from that of knowing
how to play the instrument.
Besides being tacit, knowledge by familiarity is autotelic, i.e.
has its aim in itself, and cannot be used for anything but to be
related to by the knower in experience and reflection. Thirdly,
knowledge by familiarity can only be acquired by personal
acquisition and must be personal knowledge, Johannessen
says.[19] According to him, our knowledge of artworks is of
this kind. We can be very familiar with a painting or a
symphony without being able to describe it in words.
I will not discuss the finer points of Johannessen's analysis.
Instead, I will utilise it for my own purposes. As suggested, my
view is that our understanding of a non-rephrasable poem is
essentially some kind of tacit know-that. A poem that cannot
be rephrased cannot be adequately described because a
paraphrase seems to be a kind of description of a poem's main
content and possibly also its basic formal features. Further,
such a description would consist of a series of propositions. At
the same time, Brooks has correctly shown that a paraphrase
does not have to be without worth in helping us to understand
a poem. In a similar fashion a face or the sound of a clarinet
cannot be adequately described, but descriptions can be of aid
in identifying them: 'John has a round face', 'the clarinet
sounds like the song of certain birds' etc. Both the paraphrases
and the descriptions are put forth in propositions and are in
Brooks's terminology 'pointers'[20]: they point towards the
truth.
Well, I certainly hope that my theories point in that very
direction. Actually, my theory about the tacit nature of our
understanding of poetry gives my analysis the virtue of
testability. There must be some ways of finding out in an
empirical fashion whether or not our understanding of nonparaphrasable poems is tacit. If it turns out that it were not the
case, that fact would weaken my defence of the nonparaphrasability of typical poems. And if there also were

serious logical flaws in my possible world examples, then it
would be hard to see how I can uphold my defence. So
whatever lack of merit my arguments might have, I am not
moving in vicious circles. Nobody can accuse me of just
deciding by fiat that poems are typically not paraphrasable.
It is time to sum up this article in a few words: Paradigmatic
examples of poems are not paraphrasable. A prosaic text can
be improved with the aid of a paraphrase, a typical poem is
only destroyed. The deeper explanation for the nonrephrasability of poetry is that our understanding of it is
basically tacit. Thus, we have strengthened the foundations of
Brooks's original thesis.
Only the anti-heretic can undertake the logical mystery tour of
poetic interpretation. The heretics will be left behind in the
grey land of paraphrases and empty phrases.[21]
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